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THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
AND TME RECEPTION OF ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE BY THE APPELLATE COURT
Introduction
The problem of broaching a new idea or new facts which
may change the entire course of the case at the appellate level
is not new. It has been suggested that the fundamental problem
concerning appeals is to try to avoid them entirely by making
the trial so efficient that the appeal will be unnecessary.1 While
this may be the goal of every attorney, the fact remains that
in any given case it may be extremely difficult to appraise the
totality of grounds for complaint or defense. Counsel may ex-
tract what he believes to be the real issue in a case and then
marshal his evidence around that issue at the trial only to find
that the trial judge is not convinced. This usually happens at
final judgment and the trial attorney then realizes that, perhaps,
there were other procedural or substantive matters which would
have given him a more adequate case. Is it now too late to bring
these matters to light?
The traditional answer to the question just posed is perhaps
best answered by the opinion of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico where the court was asked on appeal to reverse a con-
viction of voluntary manslaughter in the case of State v. Garcia.
2
The record conclusively showed that the defendant was uncon-
scious at the time of the killing and this fact being pointed out
to the court on appeal moved the court to say: 3
... It thus appears that it was physically impossible for Fran-
cisco Garcia to be guilty of any crime in this connection, and he
was entitled to an instruction to the jury to acquit him. Had the
matter been called to the attention of the court before instructing
the jury, no doubt he would have so directed them. But counsel
sat quiet, speculated upon the result before the jury, and aftervards
complained of an adverse result. Nor did counsel call the attention
of the court to this proposition in the motion for a new trial. Under
I Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. Rnv. 3
(1940).
2 19 N. M. 414, 143 Pac. 1012 (1914).
3 Id., 143 Pac. at 1013, 1014.
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such circumstances, no relief can be granted here. No question is
here for decision; the court below never having decided the point.
The proposition, as presented, amounts to an appeal to this court
for the first time to award a new trial to a defendant on the ground
of the absence of evidence to convict him, when the lower court
has never been asked to so decide. This is not available.
While this language in the Garcia case, supra, may otherwise
seem startling,4 the usual holding when a proffer of new evi-
dence or re-evaluation of the record evidence is urged upon the
appellate tribunal is that the court is bound by constitutional
limits to answer questions of law alone.5 More practical reasons,
such as lending finality to the judgment and settling litigation,
or realizing the appellate court has no trial facilities, serve
as well."
Remedies at Common Law
In order that some explanation may be made for the reluct-
ance of our courts to vary the settled method of procedure, a
certain grasp of the varied paths available both to the verdict
and judgment below and on appeal is necessary. Since we trace
almost everything to the English common law at some time or
another, the available common law remedies form a foundation
for the present discussion.
In the beginning a basic distinction must be taken as between
equity appeals and the use of the writ of error at law. On an
appeal from an action in equity, an appeal in the original sense
of the word, it was the usual practice to review the facts in the
record.7 It is not unusual to see the equity appeal termed a trial
4 Upon rehearing the court awarded a new trial to appellant on the theory
that it was within the court's guarded discretion to award a new trial to
prevent an injustice. Id., 140 Pac. at 1014.
5 People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (Cal. 1954).
6 Dolcin Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 219 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
One learned authority puts it this way: "Where there are intermediate
appellate courts . . . there is a general tendency to limit the ultimate re-
viewing tribunals to questions of law, with an idea that the chief function
of that court is to preserve uniformity in the decisions of the intermediate
courts and beyond that to deal with great questions of public law and new
questions of private law of exceptional importance." POUND, APILL.T
PaOCEDURE 3N Crvii. CASE S 371 (1941). See objections and criticism thereto
in Note, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1317 (1943).
7 This review of facts, according to one authority, was limited to the
record only and no new evidence was taken or could be taken. Sunderland,
Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. REv. 3, 9 (1940). But
others call it a removal of the case; a continuation in the higher court
where there was a re-trial of the facts as well as the law. SmmuPwA, Com-
MoN-LAw PLEADiNG 537 (3d ed. 1923). See 3 DANML, Cmm. cEaY PLEADING
Aim PRAcTicE 1616 (2d ed. 1846), where it is said that the equity appeal cov-
ers grounds existing at the time, not ex post facto.
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de novo on both the law and the facts." On the other hand, the
appeal was unknown to the law courts and the principal method
of obtaining review for erroneous judgments at common law
is by writ of error.9 It appears that even before the writ of
error was solidified as a remedy in itself there was a method
sometimes used both to over-reach the verdict of the common
law jury and the judge. This was termed the action of attaint.10
Because this action was directed to the judge of the trial court
personally, rather than to the judgment the court issued, it has
been said that in such a complaint the trial judge ought to be
entitled to know the nature of the charges against him.1 Hence,
such is the basis for limiting the review on writ of error to the
record of the trial below and the reluctance of the court to
entertain new evidence or other evidence to impeach the de-
cision of the court below.
The scope of the available remedies provided by the common
law and still in general use in this country seem to offer plaus-
ible proof that a party may not be barred entirely from further
action. It is generally recognized that although it presently is
quite usual to call recourse to the appellate court an appeal,
the real nature of the remedy is the common law writ of error
under an erroneous equity title.12 Unless specifically broadened
by statute, the appeal today is limited strictly to the record
below.13 In People v. Loftus, 14 the court reiterated the general
rule:
Therefore, when the review is had upon the common-law record,
8 See note 7 supra.
9 SnipzLiN, CommON L&w PLEADING 537 (3d ed. 1923).
10 See 2 POLLOCK AMD ArLAmND, THE HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 665-8 (2d
ed. 1952). Herein decisions of the communal and signorial tribunals were
reviewed by the action of attaint. The verdict of a 12-man jury could be
reviewed by a 24-man jury. These jurors reviewed the facts and could
overturn the verdict of the first jury, which was then known as the false
verdict, by giving the true verdict. Likewise, a complaint against the
judgment of the lord-judge, an accusation against him personally for error
of law, could be taken. In both proceedings the action or complaint was
directed at the judge or jury personally, not the verdict or judgment.
11 Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. REV. 3,
7-8 (1940).
12 SHIPAN, ConIoN LAw PLEADING 539 (3d ed. 1923). Other aspects of
traditional procedure are covered in Note, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1313 (1943).
33 Union Trust Co. v. Harrison's Nurseries, Inc., 180 Md. 651, 26 A.2d 812,
814 (1942). Statutes may broaden the appeal court's powers, e.g., where
the appeal is on a criminal conviction and the reviewing court can revalue
the facts, search the record anew and draw new facts therefrom. See N.Y.
CODE CRMn. PRoc. §§ 528, 542; People v. Strollo, 191 N.Y. 42, 83 N.E. 573
(1908).
14 400 111. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1948).
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the sole matter only that may be considered by the court is error
appearing upon the face of the record, and matters may not be
added by argument, affidavit, or otherwise, to supply or expand
the record. The case must stand or fall upon the errors appearing
in the record.1 5
Since recourse to the appellate tribunal is thus limited, the
immediate path to relief lies in appealing to the trial court itself.
The traditional methods in both civil and criminal actions were
either by immediate motion in arrest of judgment or the later
filing of the writ of error coram nobis.16 The motion in arrest
of judgment has generally fallen into disuse being supplanted
by the motion for a new trial.17 To a great extent the motion
for a new trial, where it is used to bring forth matters not ap-
pearing in the record and the time for bringing such a motion
is lengthy, has also obviated the use of the writ of error coram
nobis.18 Some states have specifically withdrawn coram nobis
as a method of relief and supplanted motion practice in its
stead,' 9 but the remedy has not lost its efficacy,2 0 especially in
15 The record itself is or may be very lengthy. In a criminal case it in-
cludes bringing up all the records used at the trial besides the formal
papers of the indictment, arraignment, pleas, judgment and the bill of
exceptions. These elements of the trial record, except the bill of exceptions
in a plea of guilty on a criminal charge, form the mandatory procedure in
Illinois. People v. Loftus, 400 IlM. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1948).
16 See generally, ORFiELD, CRmINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 494,
522 (1947); Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, 20
VA. L. REv. 423 (1934).
17 Generally the motion in arrest of judgment was used to challenge the
jurisdiction, legal sufficiency of the indictment, or the regularity of the
proceedings after final judgment; the motion for a new trial now raises
these objections in most jurisdictions and may be used before and after
judgment. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 494, 498
(1947).
18 Error coram nobis for newly discovered evidence after the time for
seeking or moving for a new trial to vacate the judgment is rarely used
where the motion for a new trial on those grounds has an extended time.
For example, Nebraska allows three years to make the motion for new
trial on newly discovered evidence in a criminal case. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2103 (1943).
19 E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2103 (1943); Note, 19 NEB. L. REv. 150 (1940).
See generally, State v. Kubus, 68 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1955).
20 See generally, Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice,
20 VA. L. REv. 423, 424 (1934), where the author defines and contrasts:
"The writ of error coram nobis is a writ applied for at a subsequent term
of the same court, in fact before the same judge, which rendered the judg-
ment to have the judgment revoked for errors of fact not apparent on the
record nor negligently withheld from the court by the applicant. The writ
is to be sharply differentiated from the ordinary writ of error used in
appellate practice. The ordinary writ of error is applied for in an appellate
court, is brought for errors of law apparent on the record and brings up
the case to the appellate court, which after passing on the alleged errors
affirms or reverses the judgment."
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criminal proceedings, where it has reached its greatest signif-
icance in this country.21 While the above remedies are designed
to instigate review of the facts or newly discovered evidence,
neither are of any assistance where the practitioner has been
merely negligent in bringing the matters before the court in the
first instance.22 It is imperative that the record itself be intact
and contain the relevant features of the case.
Statutory Change in the Law
England made the first decisive change in appellate procedure,
changing the scope of review and allowing the introduction of
new evidence at the appellate level in 1883. This was done
pursuant to rule 4 of Order 58, Rules of the Supreme Court
of Judicature (1883), whereby it was provided that the court
of appeal would have discretionary power to receive evidence
omitted in the trial court. This subsequent evidence could relate
to matters arising before or after the final judgment below, but
where it was capable of being brought before the trial court,
the appellate court had to be first asked for leave to bring in such
evidence.23 While not specifically providing for the introduc-
tion of new evidence, Canada also appears to be relaxing the
aspect of finality of the judgment of the trial court.
24
21 Indiana has used the writ extensively in criminal cases, as seen in
Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 186 N.E. 293 (1933). There is no jury
trial nor attendance by the petitioner at the hearing on the request for a
new trial by means of the writ of error coram nobis. Dillon v. State, 231
Ind. 396, 108 N.E.2d 881 (1952).
22 Although it has been held in a federal case that there is no statute of
limitations on coram nobis, Strode v. Stafford Justices, 23 Fed. Cas. 236,
No. 13,537 (C.C. Va. 1810), the writ does not lie for issues which were
settled at the trial or for those which a diligent attorney might have un-
covered. It lies for errors of fact which never came before the court for
decision and matters into which the court has not inquired. Orfield, The
Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L. Rsv. 423, 428 (1934).
So it is said that perjury is not subject to review by coram nobis because
the writ is unavailable as to litigated issues. Coppock v. Reed, 189 Iowa
581, 178 N.W. 382 (1920). In such case habeas corpus is the usual remedy.
See note 63 infra.
23 Spencer v. Ancoats Vale Rubber Co., [1888] 58 L.T.R. 363 (CA.) On
the facts in this case the plaintiff was allowed to bring in new evidence,
but the court saw fit to allow the defendant an opportunity to cross-
examine if necessary. Such new evidence could be brought in orally, by
affidavit or deposition and a hearing before a magistrate was provided.
The court of appeals does not sit as a trial court. Compare, Crawford v.
Crawford, 163 Kan. 126, 181 P.2d 526 (1947).
24 The Canadian Supreme Court Act provides: "49. At any time during
the pendency of an appeal before the Court, the Court may, upon the
application of any of the parties, or without any such application, make
all such amendments as are necessary for the purpose of determining the
appeal, or the real question or controversy between the parties as disclosed
by the pleadings, evidence or proceedings." CAN. REv. STAT. c. 259 (1952).
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It is already evident that most American jurisdictions have
made no great change in the status of their appellate procedure.
As late as 1909 the American Bar Association complained of
the inadequqcv of reviewing powers and suggested that, within
reasonable limits, an appellate court should be allowed to take
new evidence to correct mere formal defects, to supply defi-
ciencies where there is record evidence, and especially where
the proffered evidence cannot admit of any doubt.25 Following
closely on the report of the A.B.A., a few jurisdictions passed
statutes which attempted to liberalize appellate procedure by
allowing the introduction of new evidence. The more usual pro-
visions apply to cases where a jury trial has been waived or
where a jury trial is not permissible, and these provisions allow
the appellate court to make additional findings on the record
and take additional evidence. 26 These statutes have variously
suffered the extreme punishment of outright invalidity on con-
stitutional grounds, 27 the failure to be re-enacted from limita-
tion and dis-use,28 and strict limitation to matters such as in-
contestable extraneous records.29 Stressing the jurisdictional
provisions of the Illinois constitution, the court, in Atkins v.
Atkins, 30 refused a tender of additional evidence pursuant to
statute:
The facts stated in the affidavits, if admitted in evidence, would be
relevant to the question of appellant's good faith in the establish-
25 34 A.B.A. REP. 578, 598 (1909).
26 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 956a, 988i (1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 28-2732
(1943); Wis. STAT. § 251.09 (1953).
27 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, § 216 (1) (d) (1947); Comment, 43 ILL. L. REv.
76, 86 (1948).
28 The New Jersey law in 1912 and until 1937, N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:27-362
(1937), provided that new evidence could be taken by affidavit where the
evidence was capable of record proof and where it did not involve some
jury question. Very few cases appear to have ever been decided under the
law. One case, Vailsburg Amusement Co. v. Criterion Inv. Co., 108 N.J.L.
442, 159 Atl. 147 (1932), limited the application to reversals on mere
technical grounds because of oversight of some obvious fact at the trial, and
no additional evidence was allowed. The provision was dropped from the
1951 re-enactment by the legislature.
29 KA_. GEN. STAT. § 60-3316 (1949). See Bankers' Mortgage Co. v. Dole,
130 Kan. 647, 287 Pac. 906, 907 (1930), where the court said: "This section
has often been unsuccessfully invoked by litigants attempting to supply
evidence which was wanting to support the judgment of the trial court,
or to overthrow the judgment, but this court has repeatedly held that it
may serve a useful purpose in facilitating the discharge of this court's
appellate functions where the supplemental evidence is of a character
whose accuracy is beyond dispute." That such statute cannot constitu-
tionally extend to merely cumulative evidence, nor evidence capable cf
dispute at the trial, see Gibson v. Enright, 135 Kan. 181, 9 P.2d 971 (1932).
3o 393 Ill. 202, 65 N.E.2d 801 (1946).
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ment of a domicile in Nevada. But the constitution of this State
forbids this court exercising original jurisdiction in any cases ex-
cept those relating to revenue, mandamus and habeas corpus. In
all cases other than the three named, the jurisdiction is appellate,
only ....
... If the affidavits should be considered as evidence, it would
be assuming original jurisdiction ... .31
The statute in California 2 appears to have been the result of
much time and study in this field of appellate powers. In the
first place, the statute was not made merely pursuant to legisla-
tive power but came about through an unopposed constitutional
amendment,3 3 giving the legislature specific power to grant any
court of appellate jurisdiction the power to make findings of fact
contrary or in addition to those made by the trial court, as well
as the power to take additional evidence concerning facts occur-
ring after the judgment below and before the decision on appeal.
It would seem that after such thorough preparation this statute
could withstand the charges that the distinction between original
and appellate jurisdiction cannot be violated. In the general
view of these matters the lack of constitutional jurisdiction pre-
sented the basic problem. When the validity and efficacy of this
provision reached the supreme court of the state in Tupman v.
Haberke., 3 1 the court did not concern itself with the validity
of the provision, but it certainly limited the efficacy in at least
two respects. Where the trial court has made findings contrary
to the appellant on substantial evidence, the court held that the
statute did not expressly allow the appellate tribunals to invade
such findings. This holding, properly speaking, amounts to no
more than an affirmance of the general rule that the appellate
tribunal will not re-weigh the evidence.35 Next the court held
31 Id., 65 N.E.2d at 803. The same distinction is emphasized in Garaventa
v. Gardella, 63 Nev. 304, 169 P.2d 540 (1946). The court here dwelled upon
the essential difference in the province of trial and appellate tribunals.
There was no statute involved in this case, but the appellant urged that
an undertaking to review the evidence was not improper where the decision
of the trial court was on a transcript of the evidence. While recognizing
some support found in federal cases where depositions are used, the court
refused to re-weigh the evidence for the reason that it had no constitutional
power or jurisdiction to weigh evidence without regard to the trial court
findings.
32 See note 26 supra.
33 CAL. CoNsT. art. 6, § 4 / (1951). The legislative history is thoroughly
discussed in the case of Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 280 Pac. 970
(1929).
-3 208 Cal 256, 280 Pac. 970 (1929).
35 California appellate tribunals have the power, however, upon reversal
to direct a verdict in favor of the appellant where the record shows that
the respondent could not successfully meet the contentions on a remand
to the trial court. Supra note 33, 280 Pac. at page 975.
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that pursuant to the statute it would receive new evidence but
only in aid of affirmance; that it could not render a judgment
not having the power to pronounce judgment.36 The court did
conclude, however, that if there were a reversal, such reversal
might be fortified by a finding of facts in its support. This con-
struction of the statute was deemed by the court to preserve the
fundamental distinction between the functions of the trial and
appellate tribunals while still providing some new area of relief
as the new statute intended."
The North Dakota statute,3s while providing for an immediate
stay in proceedings to allow the trial court to take evidence it
erroneously excluded, also made provision for the supreme court
to try anew the entire case on motion of the appellant. This
provision has been quite extensively relied upon, but it has
been held to merely allow the appellate court to review the
record as submitted from the trial court in search of any error
of law or fact into which the court below might have fallen.
No new evidence is brought into the appellate court, and the
inquiry is not a trial de novo9.3  The Wisconsin statute gen-
erally has received the same limitations.
40
36 The logic the court used is delicate. It started on the premise that the
statute provided that the appellate court could render judgment for the
appellant on new evidence. But if the reviewing court did so an impossible
situation would result; that is, the trial court clerk would have a contrary
judgment for the respondent to issue process upon in accordance with the
trial court's judgment, and the clerk of the appellate court has no means
to issue process in order to enforce the adverse appellate judgment. The
court concluded, therefore, that it would have to remand for further
proceedings, and it could not merely award a new judgment.
37 The Tupman case, see note 33 supra, 280 Pac. at 974, shows the original
scope of the statute: "It often happens that a litigant neglects to prove
some simple fact in the trial court which is essential to his case in which,
if he could prove it in the appellate court, would produce a result favorable
to him."
38 See note 26 supra.
39 State v. City of Williston, 72 N.D. 486, 8 N.W.2d 564 (1943). Such a con-
struction was necessary in order to preserve the statute from the threat
of an unconstitutional exercise of original jurisdiction, if the statute meant
a new trial could be had.
40 Braasch v. Bonde, 191 Wis. 414, 211 N.W. 281 (1926). In this case the
court received additional evidence, a chattel mortage, on appeal and decided
its validity pursuant to the statute because the question was one of law.
See also San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Board of Nat. Missions,
276 P.2d 829 (Cal. App. 1954), taking additional evidence of fact on whether
or not a judge had complied with a stipulation to view the premises in
question; Lawrence Barker, Inc. v. Briggs, 39 Cal2d 654, 248 P.2d 897,
907 (1952) (dissenting opinion) as to the suggested use of the statute




In some jurisdictions the statutes concerning the appellate
powers expressly provide for the taking of additional evidence
where the action below is equitable as distinguished from an
appeal at law. The procedure provides for a stay in order to
allow the evidence to be taken.41 It may well be that such a
procedure is a normal incident of equity jurisdiction, but the
important fact to note is that such allowances apparently do not
bring down the wrath of the appellate tribunal which, inci-
dentally, sits to hear legal appeals as well.
Exceptions to the General Rule
and Other Considerations
The preceding material shows the prevailing view that new
evidence may not be adduced at the appellate level unless it
can be accepted pursuant to a statute. Relevant to these con-
siderations is the leniency in some jurisdictions concerning the
hearing of objections or the re-weighing of evidence where the
proceeding below was a criminal or equitable cause.42 Certain
matters have been admitted by appellate courts without the aid
of a statute in aid of the best interest of justice. In Burgess v.
Lasby,43 the court listed varied cases where evidence dehors
the record was used, inter alia, to show the question had become
moot; that pending the appeal there had been a settlement; to
show circumstances occurring after the appeal which had ma-
terially affected the rights involved; and where the jurisdiction
of the trial court was in contest. Other cases stress the futility
of sending a case back to the trial court where the record fails
to contain an undisputed fact simply to have a record made of
41 Notably Iowa, IowA CODE ANm. §§ 624.2, 624.3 (1946) and Maryland, MD.
AxN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 5, § 10, 42 (1951). Both statutes strictly limit
appeals at law and allow further proceedings on remand or through the
taking of depositions to augment the record. Therefore, unless the appel-
late tribunal has the contents of an offer of proof, it will not reverse, James
v. Fairall, 168 Iowa 427, 148 N.W. 1029 (1914), but in equity there is a
trial de novo. Pazawich v. Johnson, 241 Iowa 10, 39 N.W.2d 590(1949).
42 Where the appellant acts in propria persona, it is not unusual to see the
appellate court looking into the merits of his claims, no matter how well
taken they appear, and deciding on the merits in the interest of justice.
See People v. Keeton, 278 P.2d 961 (CaL App. 1955); State v. Kubus, 68
N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1955) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1955). See also notes
12, 24, 41 supra.
43 91 Mont. 482, 9 P.2d 164, 166 (1932).
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it.44 While it has been held that affidavits or stipulations admit-
ting existing facts cannot confer power on the appellate tribunal
to decide new questions,45 even where the trial court submits
a certificate as to the facts,46 it has been admitted that there are
certain cases where this procedure is the only appropriate
method of acquainting the reviewing court with the facts.47 At
least one court has said that it would accept alleged facts as
true on appeal providing the opponent admitted them as well,
48
and one reviewing court has allowed the prosecution to supply
record evidence overlooked at the trial, but which defendant
could not have overcome.
49
An analogous problem, related to the introduction of new
evidence, and which is treated in much the same manner on
appeal, is reluctance in allowing a shift of issue on appeal. The
failure, sometimes referred to as negligence of counsel to elect
the proper theory of action in the trial court, has been held to
preclude him from asserting it on appeal regardless of the merits
of the issue and whether or not the facts would substantiate the
claim.50 More liberal jurisdictions require only that sufficient
facts be brought in, and the theory of the case or the law to be
applied will be left to the appellate court.51
44 Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 143 Kan. 757, 57 P.2d 57 (1936).
This case involved failure of the record to contain the motion for a new
trial. The motion appeared in counsel's brief and was considered on appeal.
Where both parties considered a file, not marked in evidence, the court
also considered it. Ribero v. Callaway, 87 Cal. App.2d 135, 196 P.2d 109
(1948).
45 People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521 (Cal. 1954); People v. Mooney, 176 Cal.
105, 167 Pac. 696 (1917).
46 Adams v. State, 44 Ga. App. 573, 162 S.E. 164 (1932); or a certificate
of a secretary of state, Stephens County v. J. N. McCammon, Inc., 122 Tex.
148, 52 S.W.2d 53 (1932).
47 See Maher v. Roisner, 239 Minn. 115, 57 N.W.2d 810 (1953), where the
court admitted an affidavit of opposing counsel's misconduct at the trial for
the reason that the affidavit was the only means to bring such facts to
the notice of the reviewing court. See Commonwealth v. Jester, 256 Pa.
441, 100 Atl. 993 (1917). Cf., People v. Jackson, 298 N.Y. 219, 82 N.E.2d
14, 18 (1948), on the availability of error coram nobis.
48 State v. Miller, 187 S.C. 271, 197 S.E. 310, 311 (1938) (dictum).
49 People v. Travis, 257 N.Y. 474, 178 N.E. 762 (1931) (evidence was of a
statute). Compare, People v. Luckman, 248 App. Div. 233, 289 N.Y. Supp.
70 (2d Dep't 1936); Flynn v. Brooks, 105 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (court
allowed evidence concerning non-joinder of indispensible parties).
50 Lohman v. Edgewater Holding Co., 227 Minn. 40, 33 N.W.2d 842 (1948);
criticized in 34 IOWA L. Rsv. 521 (1949), wherein the writer claims that the
facts substantiated the new theory and the tendered argument went to
the cause of action.
51 E.g., see Eads v. Marks, 39 C.2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952), where the




There remain two substantial areas of judicial power where
the objection to an introduction of new evidence on appeal is
of little or no avail. The first exception to the rule is that the
appellate court may, by the exercise of judicial notice, take
cognizance of facts and law outside of the record. Perhaps one
of the oldest cases of note recognizing this rule is United States
v. The Schooner Peggy,5 2 wherein it was said that:
It is, in the general, true, that the province of an appellate court
is only to inquire whether a judgment, when rendered, was erron-
eous or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before the
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed ... .53
The other general exception, and perhaps the most important,
is fraud or concealment of existing facts from the trial court
which would have necessitated a different judgment if known.
This must be distinguished from grounds supporting a motion
for a new trial for newly discovered evidence since such con-
cealment is of facts existing at or before trial, not otherwise
known to the parties. One of the more recent cases on this
point is Linn v. Linnf, where the court held that misconduct
during the interlocutory period, which was kept from the trial
court, amounted to a fraud on the court within the province
of equity to relieve:
We cannot accept the theory that, . . . the court on which the
fraud is practiced is powerless to set aside the decree after it has
become final. The proper administration of justice is inconsistent
with such a result.55
Also it has been held that jurisdictional facts may be opened
for the first time on appeal by the court's own motion,56 or upon
52 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
53 Id. at 109-110. For more recent applications of this rule see State v.
Jacobson, 348 Mo. 258, 152 S.W2d 1061 (1941). In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Vest, 122 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 696 (1941), the
court took judicial notice of a statute urged by neither party. Likewise,
in a conflicts case, unpleaded foreign law will be deemed the same as that
of the forum. Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 RI. 162, 192
AtL. 158 (1937).
51 69 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. 1955).
55 Id. at 151. It was argued here that Michigan statutory procedure had
precluded either a motion for a hearing on newly discovered evidence or a
rehearing on such facts; that in effect the Supreme Court was deciding
the case anew after final decree and time for subsequent motions had
passed. Brief for Appellee, p. 8, Linn v. Linn, 69 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. 1955).
The controlling case appeared to be Allen v. Allen, 341 Mich. 543, 67 N.W.2d
805 (1954), where, three years after a final determination, a motion to
vacate on facts of misconduct concealed from the trial court, was held
proper on the grounds of fraud.
56 United States Express Co. v. Hurlock, 120 Md. 107, 87 Atl. 834 (1913).
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collateral 57 or direct attack.58
It would appear, therefore, that under certain circumstances,
an appellate tribunal would accept a tender of additional evi-
dence pursuant to the common law and in the best interests of
justice. It may well be that such evidence is tendered to justify
the denial of a new trial or rehearing directed to the trial
court,59 but essentially such consideration admits that the fear
of clogging appellate procedure with trial work is not always per-
tinent. While some appellate courts may not have facilities for
taking additional evidence in the manner of a trial court, many
possess original jurisdiction over special matters so that taking
evidence is nothing unusual.60 Even in the Supreme Court, where
it is the general rule that there will be no inquiry into the facts,61
the Court will make an independent examination of the facts
when deciding whether or not a person has been deprived of
a fundamental right.6 2 Such examples of liberality, it is sub-
mitted, shake the foundations of finality given to the decisions
below and, though these tactics are in the interest of justice
and the only proper procedure to follow on appeal, it would
seem that any doubt concerning their propriety is purely
traditional.
Another example of liberality is the present attitude of the
federal courts concerning review of state court judgments on
the writ of habeas corpus. Traditionally the scope of review
was confined to the record of the trial court, and extrinsic evi-
dence was not admissible; but pursuant to statutory change and
court construction the petitioner "may have a judicial inquiry
... into the very truth and substance of the causes of his de-
tention, although it may become necessary to look behind and
57 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
58 Burgess v. Lasby, 91 Mont. 482, 9 P.2d 164 (1932); compare People v.
Carmen, 273 P.2d 521 (Cal. 1954).
59 See note 54 supra.
60 While a jury trial has not been held in the Supreme Court since Georgia
v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), and now a jury trial in an original
action probably could not be had, it was understood for many years that
such was available in the highest tribunal. STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 275 (2d ed. 1954). Compare Dolcin Corp. v. Federal Trade
Comm., 219 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
61 STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 100 (2d ed. 1954). On the
question whether the Supreme Court will hear new evidence, see Note, 56
HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1323 (1943); Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222,
225 (1885).
62 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 373 (1947); STERN & GRESSMAN, op. cit. supra, p. 101.
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beyond the record of his conviction. .63
Conclusion
The basis for prohibiting the introduction of new evidence or
refraining from an extensive inquiry into the facts of the case
on appeal, as before stated, traces itself to the notion that the
court below is presently being charged with error. This charge
of error, being in the nature of a complaint, required that the
trial judge be given fair and just treatment by the appellate
tribunal. Likewise, where the jurisdictional powers of the vari-
ous courts are codified, as many are, the notion that only
questions of law may be presented on appeal stems from the
distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction. This
author seriously doubts that jurisdiction in these matters is
purely a creature of the modern statutes, but rather, the notion
of the difference between the province of the trial and appellate
courts at common law. Determined on the common law, those
cases which allow the reception of evidence or inquiry and, re-
interpretation of the facts do so in light of the demands of
justice or the proper administration of justice. It would appear,
then, that in each case the rationale must ultimately rest on
whether or not justice demands a contrary course be followed.
It must be understood that even in the most pressing case
a court may legitimately refuse a tender of additional evidence
substantiating a claim by merely saying that: ". . . even as-
suming that additional evidence could be received . .. the facts
stated . . .are insufficient .... "4 While the tactic of answering
tendered objections by way of dictum may satisfy the requisites
of justice in a given case, a different result may be demanded
when the facts present grounds for reversal. The question posed
is: On which side does the greater weight of justice lean? If
the answer is to be found by referring merely to the procedural
techniques which arbitrarily preclude further proceedings on
the appellate level in the interest of finality, such as the con-
cept of appellate jurisdiction, the fact that the judge and jury
below did not consider these additional facts, or that the appellate
63 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915). The grounds for habeas
corpus are now very broad, and cases may involve facts admittedly ex-
traneous to the record, e.g., conviction obtained by perjured testimony;
trial court under dominion of mob violence. See Holtzoff, Collateral Review
of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. Rev. 26 (1945). State
procedure in habeas corpus may be more limited. People v. Jackson, 298
N.Y. 219, 82 N.E.2d 14 (1948).
64 People v. Carmen, 273 P.2d 521, 525 (Cal. 1954) (dictum).
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court has no trial facilities, then this is what justice demands.
It would seem, however, that for each reason there exists a
relatively simple answer and that there is no pressing need to
sacrifice an unknowing party's claim merely because his attorney
might have been trying to win on the key issue. If, in truth,
certain omitted facts do exist and the opponents are willing to
admit them by any means, (and should not there be a duty
to disclose?) then it would appear that an answer could be given,
if for no other reason than that they have waived objections.
When the California Supreme Court understood that the statute
would require them to hear additional evidence as a function
of an appeal, they forthwith provided for means to have hearings
on new questions of fact pursuant to the statute.65 While there
is always the possibility that a change might open appellate
procedure to certain delays and that negligence of counsel may
be rewarded, it is submitted that in the end each case of this
kind could be settled on the merits of every claim. If a jury
is required, then it is not impossible to provide the full measure
of justice to the parties. The common law is not unused to change.
Norman H. Mc Neil
65 See Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 CaL 256, 280 Pac. 970 (1929), but note
that the construction this court placed upon the statute rendered the use
of such a procedure of little consequence.
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